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Joseph A. Jetikics 
Mas u-
City Attorney's 
Office 
351 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, I tuh 84003 
801-3~9-»-,; iO 
March 17, 1989 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq. 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Robert Bennett, et. al. v. Bow Valley 
Development Corp., aka Flying Diamond 
Development Corp., a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
and Stephen G. Stewart, an individual 
(Case No. 870118) 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
The above cited case has been fully briefed and 
submitted to the Utah Supreme Court for decision. 
However, subsequent to this case being submitted for 
decision, four relevant cases have been decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court which are relevant to the issues of 
this case. Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, respondent Provo City Corporation cites 
these four cases for consideration by the Court. 
In Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 740 P.2d 
1337 (Utah, 1987), the plaintiff had alleged a negligence 
cause of action. The Court states that merely "phrasing 
the claim as one for negligence does not bring it within 
the category of claims for which immunity is waived" (at 
1340). It then went on to re-characterize the claim as 
one for battery and false imprisonment and stated that 
for these actions immunity was not waived. (See Point 
III.A., pages 25-30, Respondent's Brief). Appellant 
argues that claims in equity are not barred by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Maddocks case makes it 
clear that just because the plaintiff says it is a claim 
in equity does not make it so. 
In the case of Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah, 2988), the Court discusses 
which of the many decisions by city and state officials 
should be analyzed by the Court to determine if 
discretionary immunity existed. Gleave, citing prior 
case law (beginning at 668) sets forth a logical test and 
finds immunity for a state employee's decision concerning 
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which sign should be installed at a railroad crossing. 
In Loveland v. City of Orem, 746 P.2d 763 (Utah, 1987), 
the Court finds a variety of relevant activities immune 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Court 
finds that (1) the monitoring by city employees of the 
construction and development of property, (2) the 
Planning Commission's recommendation (or lack thereof) 
of particular provisions in regard to development, and 
(3) the failure of the city engineer or other city 
employees charged with supervising and monitoring 
construction of a subdivision to insure that the 
improvements were installed as required, are all immune 
under the Act. (See Point II, pages 15-24, Respondent's 
Brief). In this case, city officials made similar types 
of decisions. 
Finally, in Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(December 12, 1988), the Court held that for causes of 
action that arose before the Governmental Immunity Act 
Amendments of 1983, the notice requirements of that Act 
do not apply when a government employee is sued in an 
"individual11 rather than "public" capacity. In 
distinguishing when an employee of a governmental entity 
is being sued in an individual or public capacity, the 
Court says that causes of action based on fraudulent or 
malicious conduct are claims in an individual capacity 
for which, in 1980, governments had neither the 
obligation to indemnify nor defend the employee. (See 
Point III.D., pages 37-39; and Point IV, pages 39-42, 
Respondent's Brief). 
Thank you for your attention to these cases. 
Sincerely, 
David C. Dixon 
Robert D. West 
Provo City 
Attorney's Office 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DCD/bb 
cc. Craig Anderson 
